PALESTINE IS A VICTIM OF THE IRANIAN-SAUDI WAR

Muslim worshippers perform Friday noon prayer near the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem's Old City's al-Aqsa mosque compound on Dec. 22, 2017. Ahmad Gharabli /AFP

The two regional powerhouses are more focused on fighting each other than challenging Trump's Jerusalem decision.

On Feb. 18, 1979, just a few days after the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the triumphant return to the country of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a private plane landed in Tehran at dusk carrying Yasser Arafat. The Palestinian leader was the first foreign dignitary to visit Tehran after the revolution, and he seemed buoyed by hopes that the historic events would provide him with momentum in his own liberation struggle. “I felt as if I was landing in Jerusalem,” he later told Iranian reporters.

The next day, the Israeli trade mission was handed over to Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization. “Today, we are witnessing the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran and tomorrow we shall be the victors in Palestine,” an ebullient Arafat declared. “We shall liberate the land of Palestine under the leadership of Imam Khomeini.”

Even before returning to Iran, Khomeini had cleverly identified the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the issue that would allow him to rally the Muslim world and expand the appeal of his revolution beyond his Shiite sect. And ever since 1979, the Palestinian cause has been at the center of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional preeminence.

At any other time, U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel would therefore constitute an opportunity for the two regional powers to one-up each other in opposition to the move. These days, however, Saudi Arabia and Iran are too busy fighting each other to offer significant pushback to Trump’s decision.

While Iranian support has not delivered Jerusalem to the Palestinians, the cause has served Iran’s regional ambitions well. In 1979, Iran launched a yearly Jerusalem Day to broadcast its support for the Palestinians and named the elite expeditionary unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) after the holy city. It has also extended its influence into the Arab world by arming and financing the Palestinian militant group Hamas and the Lebanese organization Hezbollah.

In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, even Saudi Arabia seemed ready to present a common front with Iran on the issue of Palestine. Following Arafat’s visit to Tehran, a headline in the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai al-Aam on Feb. 19 read: “Saudi Arabia praises the Iranian revolution.”

Yes, you read that right. Before Saudi Arabia and Iran started ripping the region apart, Riyadh seemed ready to work with Iran’s new leaders even as

Before Saudi Arabia and Iran started ripping the region apart, Riyadh seemed ready to work with Iran’s new leaders

their friend the Shah had just been removed. Quoting the Saudi newspaper Al-Nadwa, Al-Rai al-Aam said Saudi Arabia had warned against any moves that would undermine the “courageous stance taken by Iran in support of the Arab nation and its struggle against the Zionist enemy.”

Needless to say, this was a short-lived moment, which ended when the Saudis realized the danger Khomeini posed to them — but it was indicative of the mood in the region at the time, just a decade after the searing defeat of the 1967 Six-Day War. The Saudis tried to keep up with the Iranians’ rhetoric and posturing: After initially indicating tepid support for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s peace accords with Israel in 1978, they reversed course by early 1979. Arafat, emboldened by Khomeini’s support, led the charge against Egypt with other hardliners, like Syria, also a Khomeini ally. In April 1979, Saudi Arabia cut ties with Egypt and its information minister excoriated Sadat for his decision to “exchange diplomatic representation with the Zionist enemy, without taking into consideration the minimum demands.”

But constrained by its alliance with the United States, Saudi Arabia never fully backed an armed struggle against Israel. It always preferred to offer diplomatic initiatives, from the peace plan put forward by King Fahd in 1982 to King Abdullah’s 2002 peace initiative. This was part of Saudi Arabia’s effort to build up its image as a consensus builder and a regional leader that could deliver the rest of the Arab world for a comprehensive peace with Israel.

Today, the Saudis are even more constrained — not only by their alliance with Washington but by their almost singled-minded focus on beating back Iran, for which they need U.S. support. There have also been numerous reports about Saudi-Israeli security cooperation in the face of Iran, a bigger strategic priority than the symbolism of defending Jerusalem. Perhaps as a way of keeping Saudi Arabia in line, the White House for the first time chided Saudi Arabia for the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen within an hour of Trump’s Jerusalem announcement. The kingdom did issue a statement after the Jerusalem decision, expressing “great disappointment” and “serious consequences” after such an “irresponsible and unwarranted step.” But there’s been little else.

As the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Robert Satloff detailed in Foreign Policy, a delegation from his think tank visited Riyadh as Trump’s move on Jerusalem unfolded — but heard nary a word about it from numerous Saudi officials and only a brief complaint from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself. Perhaps the Saudis were being polite to visitors, but politeness didn’t stop King Abdullah from once calling on visiting American officials to “cut off the head of the snake” in reference to Iran.

By- Kim Ghattas

BBC correspondent covering international affairs

Public policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center.